Michael Davitt
I intend to show that there are clear differences between Plato, Dewey and Lippmann in how they view and criticise democracy. I will argue that both Plato and Lippmann offer a more damaging critique of democracy than is offered by Dewey, who ultimately remains a staunch believer in participatory democracy. I will engage with the Dewey/Lippmann debate and the views of Plato separately before comparing all three thinkers and will show that the issues and criticisms offered by Plato were still relevant and explicitly evident in the Dewey/Lippmann debate. Furthermore, I intend on arguing the point that ultimately each of Plato’s, Dewey’s and Lippmann’s positions are heavily influenced by how they interact with and view the role of the public in democratic society.
When investigating the criticisms of democracy put forward by Plato what is immediately evident is how Plato viewed democracy as an anarchic political system. In Plato’s eyes democracy was inextricably linked with freedom, but this freedom has negative implications when it results in an absence of distinct forms. For Plato the abandoning of forms leads to a sort of radical equality where no distinctions are made in hierarchy, this relates also to the publics’ toleration and pursuit of all desires and its inability to discriminate between good and bad desires (Saxonhouse, 1998, p.279). Within this framework there is the potential for anarchy in the sense that without forms and with radical equality, which makes troublesome the concept of hierarchy, there can be no distinct ruler. I believe Plato also saw this anarchy reflected in the nature of the citizen living under this democratic society. The democratic citizens reflect the anarchy Plato assigned to the democratic state in their treatment of their desires. As I have already stated, radical equality leads to the democratic citizen’s inability to decipher from good and bad desires, however Plato goes further to suggest that citizens have no dominant desires and instead treat all alike (Santas, 2001, p.65). Thus, the citizen’s nature is anarchic, just like the democratic state, in that it too is not ruled in any meaningful way by a dominant desire or enduring element (Johnstone, 2013, p.157). It is clear then that one of Plato’s main criticisms laid at democracy is that its relationship with freedom and radical equality creates the environment for an absence of hierarchy and a tendency towards anarchy.
As well as criticising democracy for its anarchic nature Plato further criticises it for its tendency to result in tyrannical rule. An investigation into Plato’s ideas would lead to the conclusion that this tyrannical rule is made possible as much by the political leader turned tyrannical ruler as it is by the demos at large (Fissell, 2011, p.217). Although Plato suggests the blame for tyranny should rest upon both the demos and their political leaders he makes clear that the overwhelming reason for the move to tyranny is shared greed. Both the demos and the political leader see a usefulness in the other for furthering their own greed and materialistic pursuit for wealth (Fissell, 2011, p228). The political leader is culpable of manipulation of the demos by appealing to their greed and pitting the poorer in society against the wealthier (Sharples, 1994, p8). The role of the demos in the descent into tyrannical rule is evident in its inability to recognise a tyrannical leader in the making and furthermore in its political apathy towards any action of government unrelated to the accumulation of wealth (Fissell, 2011, p.231). By describing democracy’s descent into tyranny Plato makes observations about the inability of the demos to be truly effective in participatory democracy, and by going on to discuss Plato’s alternative to democracy I will make clearer his views on the shortcomings of the demos and the role of the public in society.
Plato’s view of the demos was not a favourable one, he was critical of the ability of citizens to engage effectively with participatory democracy, and this in turn informed his ideas when constructing his alternative. In Plato’s alternative to democracy the participation of the demos is non-existent and instead society is ruled by philosophers (Ogochukwu, 2009 p52). Plato believed that only a certain few in society were capable of ruling and he suggested a hierarchal structure where the philosopher king sits at the top. Plato’s reasoning behind choosing this structure comes back to the nature of the demos. The demos have no dominant desire and are incapable of distinguishing good and bad desires, whereas the philosopher king has only the desire for knowledge and truth and therefore is the only figure capable of ruling over society (Ogochukwu, 2009 p52). The demos have little to no participation in this society as Plato sees no reason in consulting the views of the demos as by definition the philosopher king must know best due to his pursuit of the desires of knowledge and truth (Sharples, 1994, p52).
By looking at Plato’s criticisms of democracy and his alternative system of governance I have presented the main points with which I will engage when comparing his views with those of John Dewey and Walter Lippmann. Equally I have attempted to show how Plato’s position is influenced by how he interacted with and viewed the role of the public in democratic society.
Disagreements between Dewey and Lippmann are less evident in their identification of what they believed to be the problems with contemporary democracy than in their solutions on how to deal with these problems. In many ways Lippmann & Dewey agree on much, and calling it a debate may be slightly overstepping the mark. In fact, David Greenberg has suggested a replacement ‘debate’ in the form of the Lippmann/Mencken ‘debate’ (Greenberg, 2012). I have decided instead to discuss the Dewey/Lippmann ‘debate’, due in part to its popularity and scholarly impact, but also because my intention is to contrast Lippmann & Plato with a figure more sympathetic to democracy and the public’s role within it.
The main criticism against democracy put forward by Lippmann was that there exists a gap between the political capacity of the public and the complexity of the political environment and world at large (DeCesare, 2012, p106). For the most part Dewey agreed with Lippmann’s observation, however as mentioned already they differed in their solutions for this problem. Lippmann took a more pessimistic view of the democratic public and believed it was an impossibility for any individual to acquire the required knowledge in order to participate effectively and govern well. To make up for the failings of the public Lippmann devised a system in which an organisation of experts was to advise the leaders of society on political affairs (DeCesare, 2012, p109). The role of the public within Lippmann’s system would be limited to one of passive spectatorship (Schudson, 2008, p1038), with direct involvement coming only in the form of a binary choice of support for either those in power when all is well or those waiting in the wings to become the next group of leaders when all is not so well (Whipple, 2005, p160).
Dewey on the other hand took a more optimistic view of the capabilities of the public and argued that under the right circumstances the public can be effective and should have an active role in participatory democracy. Dewey agreed with Lippmann that no individual can acquire all the necessary knowledge to be omnicompetent (DeCesare, 2012 p111), however he posits that this is unnecessary and instead argues that a more communal form of shared understanding is required, something Dewey termed ‘social knowledge’. Dewey argued that instead of knowledge being an individual pursuit it should be a build-up of knowledge and understanding about the political and social environment which is created by and serves the public (DeCesare, 2012, p112). Furthermore, similar to Lippmann, Dewey recognises the benefit of having experts work for the good of democracy. In Dewey’s case however, experts are to inform and educate the public with the knowledge required to participate effectively and intelligently in their democracy (DeCesare, 2012 p113). The press and wider media also have an important part to play in Dewey’s democracy by keeping the public informed of the actions being taken by their political leaders. Moreover, in Dewey’s democracy the press is also tasked with making public the knowledge and ideas coming from the experts (Bybee, 1999, p57). In doing so the press and wider media are an instrument used for the public good by making possible the enlightened and informed public Dewey deems possible and necessary. This is in contrast to the ideas of Lippmann who views the role of the press as pessimistically as the role of the public. For Lippmann the job of the press to inform and educate the public is an impossible one (Bybee, 1999, p55). Neither the press nor the public are up to the challenge, and so the role of the press has little importance to Lippmann’s vision of a society indirectly run by experts.
As well as disagreeing on the role of the public, experts and the press in democracy, Dewey and Lippmann had fundamentally opposing views on the reason and purpose of democracy, and I argue it is for this reason we can see two very different solutions to the same agreed problem. For Lippmann the point of democracy was not in its participatory nature but strictly in the results it achieved (Bybee, 1999, p41). Democracy is desirable to Lippmann also as it is a stable form of society. In Lippmann’s solution then we can see his perceived purpose of democracy as a major influence. Participation on the part of the public is sacrificed for the prestige of the organisation of experts and their ability to get results. For Dewey the purpose of democracy is not fully in its results, but instead its purpose lies in creating the “conditions for individuals in a society to develop to their fullest potential” (Bybee, 1999, p42). The influence of Dewey’s perceived purpose can also be seen in his proposed solution, especially on his emphasis of enlightening the public and calling for mass participation in order to give each citizen a say in how their society is governed.
In my comparison of the views of Plato, Dewey and Lippmann I will begin first by looking at Plato and Lippmann to investigate the obvious similarities and more nuanced differences. Both Plato and Lippmann advocate the replacement of participatory democracy for a more exclusive and elitist form of rule. Plato advocates rule by philosophers with the philosopher king as main ruler, and Lippmann supports governance in which an organisation of experts advises leaders on political matters. Both thinkers severely limit the role of the public and look to improve society by entrusting and empowering groups of learned and knowledgeable elites. Despite these obvious similarities there exists a more nuanced difference in that Lippmann still considers himself a democrat, whereas Plato seems to denounce democracy entirely in favour of the Republic. Arguments have been put forward by Saxonhouse (2009, p745) and Hanasz (1997, p54) who suggest that because Plato criticised democracy using the figure of Socrates, who is often interpreted as a democrat, that Plato could be seen as at least sympathetic to democracy if not a democrat himself. Although these arguments are interesting and insightful I find the implied conclusion of Plato as a democrat to be rather unconvincing and would suggest that this point remains a point of difference between Plato and Lippmann.
Going on to look more broadly at the views of all three thinkers, there are very clear points of difference which exist. Some of the more obvious ones I would suggest are; the difference in the role of the public, the confidence each man has in the ability of citizens to bridge the gap between their intellectual shortcomings and the complex political landscape, and the purpose that each thinker ascribes to experts and knowledgeable people in society. However, what I will go on to address at this moment is the interesting and crucial difference of how each thinker perceives human nature. Having previously addressed how Plato perceives the nature of the democratic citizen we know that Plato believes the citizen to be incapable of deciphering between good and bad desires and as a result acts upon all desires equally (Saxonhouse, 1998, p279). Plato also believes the citizen to be apathetic to political matters unless they refer to the citizen’s ability to accumulate wealth and satisfy their greedy nature (Fissell, 2011, p231). Lippmann also ascribes to a more pessimistic view of human nature. Lippmann believed the public to be naturally passive and claims that individual citizens by nature do not have the capacity to form politically effective collective publics (Whipple, 2005, p160). Dewey goes against the more pessimistic view and argued that citizens were active and reflective by nature. He believed that political participation was an extension of human nature and that passivity is an affliction brought about by habits formed by the “passively representative, rather than, participatory political process” (Whipple, 2005 p162). I believe Dewey’s perception of human nature in turn led to his belief that public participation in democracy has value in and of itself. In contrast I believe Plato’s perception of human nature led him in the other direction to the extent that he sees no value in the participation and consultation of the public in political affairs. I would argue therefore that it is evident that Plato’s, Dewey’s and Lippmann’s preferred ideal societies are influenced mainly by how they perceive the public and its role in society.
Finally, I argue it is clear that the principal factor separating all three thinkers, and which leads each to their respective democratic ideals is how they deal with the crisis of the role of the public. Plato believes democracy cannot work due to the shortcomings of the demos, the insufficient basis of knowledge for the public to properly engage in a participatory democracy, and the tendency for that democracy to lead to tyranny due to the inability of the demos to focus its desires on the pursuit of truth and knowledge. Crucially, Plato saw no way of rectifying this situation, much like Lippmann who believed the public cannot and should not be expected to participate meaningfully in a democratic system growing in complexity and instead placed his trust in a community of experts. Dewey also recognised the political alienation the public was experiencing and in many respects agreed with Lippmann that the public as it was presently manifest was not fit for purpose. However, unlike Plato and Lippmann, Dewey believed the public could and must become better equipped to engage effectively with participatory democracy and societal issues.
In conclusion, it is clear when investigating the writings of each thinker that there are distinct differences separating their democratic positions, however I claim that each thinkers’ position is influenced by how they interact with and view the role of the public in democratic society. It is also evident that between Dewey and Lippmann it is Lippmann whose ideas venture closer to those of Plato, nevertheless their democratic views and criticisms are far from identical. Overall, I believe it is evident the issues that Plato addressed in his damning observations of Athenian democracy are issues that proved to be central in the Dewey/Lippmann debate. Although no two men held identical views on democracy the issues with which they engaged, such as the purpose of democracy, the role of the public, human nature and education, are ubiquitous among the three of them.
References
Bybee, Carl, 1999, Can Democracy Survive in the Post Factual Age? A Return to the Lippmann-Dewey Debate, Journalism & Communication Monographs, pp. 29-66.
DeCesare, Tony, 2012, The Lippmann-Dewey “Debate” Revisited: The Problem of Knowledge and The Role of Experts in Modern Democratic Theory, Philosophical Studies in Education, Vol. 43, pp. 106-17.
Fissell, Brenner M., 2011, Plato’s Theory of Democratic Decline, Polis: The Journal of the Society for Greek Political Thought, Vol. 28, Issue 2, pp. 216-35.
Greenberg, David, 2012, Lippmann vs. Mencken: Debating Democracy, Raritan, Vol. 32, Issue 2, pp. 117-41.
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Santas, Gerasimos, 2001, Plato’s criticism of the democratic man, Journal of Ethics, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp.57-72.
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Schudson, Michael, 2008, The “Lippmann-Dewey Debate” and the Invention of Walter Lippmann as an Anti-Democrat 1986-1996, International Journal of Communication, Vol 2, pp. 1031-1043.
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Skidmore-Hess, Daniel; Ellison, Jasmine; Sherrod, Chase, 2017, Policy Point – Counterpoint: Is Democracy the Best Form of Governance? Aristotelian vs. Platonic Thought, International Social Science Review, Vol 92, Issue 2, pp. 1-12.
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