Among all Lebanese politicians there is only one, who regardless of his political views and agenda is regarded by majority of the Lebanese public as a greatly influential and charismatic leader. When he is on screen everyone is watching, his speeches are highly anticipated, discussed on most political TV shows and deemed as dramatic political performances that demand urgent attention and action (Matar, 2015). His people address him as El Sayyid (The Master), the Arab world considers him the most powerful leader after the late Egyptian president Jamal Abdul Nasser, and the rest of the world views him as a leader of high consideration (Avon et al., 2012). But why does he have that great number of followers and how do people consciously and subconsciously support his vision? This essay analyzes Hassan Nasrallah’s leadership prominence as the Secretary General of Hezbollah using Max Weber’s Ideal Types of Authority. It explains how Traditional, Charismatic and Legal Authority can be combined to interpret the nature of his continuous yet problematic legitimacy and how this continues in a boundless unchallenged manner. To enhance this analysis, it also employs a decentered approach to include other relevant socio-political factors that similarly service the unbroken loyalty between him and his supporters. The paper later concludes that in a state of governmental failure and constant fight for dominance, Nasrallah’s supporters are willing to abide with whatever decisions he takes in his internal and external policies. They are willing to abide not necessarily because they are convinced with the decisions made, or because they are aware of the consequences of these decisions on the country. But solely because they are in need of his support and services in return and that they have been bred into the culture of supporting Hezbollah no matter the price.
Shia make up around 30% of the Islamic population in Lebanon, most of them originating from the south governorate (Landau, 1961). It is crucial to know that the majority of Shia are supporters of Nassrallah and the majority of Nasrallah followers are Shia as well (Landau, 1961). The explanation to this phenomenon in the context of Traditional Authority goes into two main points. The first being that Nasrallah is a Shia himself and a Sayyid in specific, in Shia culture, السياد “Seyyed” is an honorific title signifying that a group of people are believed to be descendants of the family of the Prophet Mohammed and are automatically regarded as nobility and elites in the Shia community (Moussaka, 2012). This holy connection Nasrallah has with the Prophet of Islamic religion provides him with the Traditional Legitimacy to rule, which Weber identifies as having an inherited legitimacy by social and traditional norms, as well as being religiously ordained to be in position of guidance (Weber, 1958). Another significance in this setting is that Nasrallah studied and taught Islamic religion after receiving his Sheikh title which makes him even more of an authorized source to be a representative of the Shia sect (Moqawama, 2008).
Furthermore, within the Shia’s doctrine, one of the main belies is that an Imam called Mahdi Al Muntathar (Mahdi the awaited) will appear in the days closer to the world’s end to save all humanity from injustice. Based on that principle they elect a “Wali” or guardian to be in charge of all decisions and the guidance of the sect until then, this principle is known as “Wilayat Al Faqih” (Tabataba’i, 1974; Moussaka, 2012). For the past 40 years, and since the Iranian revolution, the Wali has always been of Iranian descendants, with the supreme political power in Iran, and Hezbollah being a devoted supporter of the Wilayat el Faqih principle in theory and in practice by allying politically, religiously and military with Iran, makes him even more valid as a leader for Shias in Lebanon. Today Nasrallah is called El Sayyid (The Master) rather than Sayyid and this highlights the subconscious connotation among his followers that he is the chosen one. In fact, the very statement that accompanied his appointment as the secretary general after the death of Al Mousawai (co-founder and previous secretary general of Hezbollah who was assassinated by Israel) was “The best of successors to the best of predecessors” (Matar, 2015). This statement written by Al Ahd newspaper (Lebanese newspaper supporting the vison of Hezbollah) with rich historical meanings, illustrates how even the media uses terms to reassure him as a religious-political frontrunner with the traditional authorizations to lead after a successive thread of same sect rulers.
Charismatic Authority by the Weberian definition frames a leader as someone who is believed to have super natural powers, heroic and unique characteristics that make him the right person to inspire through vision and implementation (Weber, 1958). To understand how this type of authority applies in Nasrallah’s case, it is important to identify the relation between Hezbollah, Palestine, Iran and the south of Lebanon and comprehend the history of Hezbollah’s movement within this context. In the decades following the Lebanese independence from the French Mandate in 1943, Shia in Lebanon suffered from extreme marginalization and faced a lot of disregard in all political and social conversations in the country (Marusek, 2018) where most of the country’s wealth was located outside the regions occupied by Shias (Shami, 1972). While the Christians occupied the prosperous east side of Beirut, Shias occupied the south and the east of the Bekaa Valey, half of the Shia population was illiterate and only 6.6% reached high school education (Shami, 1972). Furthermore, what amplified Shia’s misery in the south was the migration of a great number of Palestinian refugees after the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 1948 and Shia became part of the ongoing fight over the Palestinian lands. Later, the liberation of Jerusalem became a religious duty to be achieved (Avon et al., 2012). The regions that the Shia occupied continued to be highly disregarded and undermined which resulted in a huge group of people migrating to the western suburbs of Beirut that would later be called “the belt of misery” (Hamzeh, 2004). A revolution of the Shias took place and Musa Al Sadr (Al Sadr) an Iranian Lebanese Shia religious figure was the leader of this movement, demanding basic rights and equal distribution of resources (Traboulsi, 2014). The movement later evolved into a multi disciplinary social movement that would provide services to everyone in need and much of the funding was raised domestically, but mainly received in huge amounts from Iran (Besheer, 2006). Later the movement launched a military force called Haraket Amal and after the disappearance of Al Sader (leader of the movement) and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by Israeli forces, a few members of Haraket Amal created Hezbollah. Hezbollah was and is still considered a continuation of Al Sadr movement that carries on supplying people with all the services and needs that the government is not able to provide (Al Nasseri, 2016). The history of oppression and negligence met with Hezbollah’s ability to act, give and build in the state of governmental failure, allowed them to gain the heroic state that Weber talks about in Charismatic Authority. Hezbollah became the savior through building chartable organizations, educational institution, health aiding association and many other service based projects (Ajami, 1987). This placed them on a pedestal in the situation of oppression, corruption and sectarianism people were facing.
Moreover, what keeps Nasrallah on this pedestal is his perception as an honest leader by his supporters and enemies (Matar, 2015). Besides what is usually meant by charisma when referring to Nasrallah in the streets is mainly the captivating attitude and firm presence he shows in his speeches, Nasrallah has always been seen by his supporters and political opponents alike, as someone who is very honest (Mollica, 2014). In 2006 Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers during the action that started the war in the early morning of 12th of July which immediately led to a war that lasted 33 days, destroyed the country and got back some of the occupied lands of Lebanon by Israel (Moqawama, 2006). During the war Hezbollah kept on promising the people that they will rebuild their houses and compensate all their losses and after war Nasrallah kept his promises and proved his honesty. Huge amounts of money were distributed to whoever came to them with a claim for restoration, injuries, rent and causalities (Payvant, 2006). They covered everything with money majorly coming from Iran and some local supporters of the party and other Arab countries (Besheer, 2006). With highly branded and publicized campaigns of restoring and rebuilding the country, Hezbollah was able to gain further legitimization by facing the state’s incapability and proving higher competence (Mollica, 2014). As The Economist (2006) phrased it: “The speed, efficiency and propaganda of Hezbollah’s reconstruction offensive have caught Lebanon’s flimsy government off the mark, and helped bolster the party’s popularity beyond its core Shia supporters”. It reassured Hezbollah’s power and Nasrallah’s validity in his supporter’s eyes, gained them more respect and reinforced their notion as an alternative to the people in the absence of the states power.
After seeing how the Traditional and Charismatic Authority relate and apply to Nasrallah’s leadership status in Hezbollah, we can now identify how these types of authorities paved the way to the third type which is Legal Authority. As Weber explains, Legal Authority is based on lawful and natural obedience to a leader elected by official procedures in a modern system and is not dictated by traditional or charismatic authority (Weber, 1958). As the previous facts about Lebanon’s social structure have shown, Lebanon is a country were everything is seen through a sectarian lens, the structure and the history of the country has been built on socio-religious fundamentals where the electoral system that was put out by the French Mandate was officially dividing parliamentary positions based on percentages of representation of sects (Landau, 1961). Having such great number of followers within the Shia community made Nasrallah unofficially the legal leader of this sect until the first post-civil war election in 1992, where they officially took part in the political system and managed to get ministers and official deputies into the Lebanese Parliament and council of ministers (Dingel, 2013). This participation gave Hezbollah the official legitimization it was missing, allowing them access to governmental resources and a platform to express their vision as part of the Lebanese political community. Ever since this move, Hezbollah has managed to become a key political leader in Lebanon’s internal and external policies (Dingel, 2013). In year 2000 and 2006 after the withdrawal of Israel from Shebaa and the 2006 war, Nasrallah’s Charismatic authority peeked and was translated into legal authority in the electoral ballots (Lebanese Elections, 2018). As Matar (2015) assures in the study of “Nasralah’s Cultivation of image and Language” the 2006 war was the vital point in changing Nasrallah from a humble figure of religion to the first charismatic leader.
In 2005 before the war and after the assassination of Lebanon’s then prime minister, Rafic Al Hariri and the initiation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, speculations were happening around Syria’s involvement in this crime and Hezbollah being an avid support to the Syrian government caused the indictment and allegations concerning several Hezbollah members (Matar, 2015). While this might be expected to raise questions among Nasrallah’s devotees, it did the opposite (Atrisi 2012). Shia’s felt they were threatened again and subject to external and internal judgment so with proper campaigns to reclaim legitimacy Hezbollah was able to avoid a downfall in their number of votes in the elections following all allegations and events happening. This highly emphasized the strength of Hezbollah as a political party with strident sustenance and Nasrallah’s influence on his people. Even after the shamed conflict of May 7, were Hezbollah initiated a huge charged protest in reaction to the governmental attempt at shutting down their telecommunication network planned around the airport and removal of the security chief of the Lebanese airport who is tied to Hezbollah (BBC, 2008). The protest later caused an armed conflict for several days between supporters and detractors of Hezbollah and around 70 civilians were dead. Despite this highly criticized and shamed event in Lebanese history after the civil war, Hezbollah was still able to prove once again the rooted support they have regardless of how their decisions affect the country and the people in the elections following the incident (Atrissi, 2012).
In a country teetering at the edge of corruption and deprivation of basic human rights, suffering from sociopolitical and geopolitical crisis, Nasrallah’s continuous problematic legitimacy stands in the face of the country’s progression and people’s independent and responsible voices. As a movement that started initially to acquire the rights of a marginalized population it is now arm-twisting them into abiding with and blindly following the party in all its decisions. Shia in Lebanon whether living in Dahye, Bekaa or the South are automatically considered pro Hezbollah, and if anyone presents an opposing opinion is socially shamed, personally addressed by some leaders of the party and will most probably receive verbal threats if his/her opinion was too strident. Correspondingly, they might be excluded from any project Hezbollah would be doing for the sake of benefiting the area. Hezbollah in Lebanon has a great number of organizations serving the people and providing them with social, educational, financial and health related aids. These projects take place as a way to preserve this authority and keep people under their wing, by using of course money provided by Iran and governmental resources they are now authorized to use (Mollica, 2014). Hezbollah continues to provide people with what they need even outside the Shia community to gain as much followers as possible, people who have no place to go, end up getting aids from these associations Hezbollah has and become part of the tribe. Rather than trying to build a system that could run officially, governmentally and with no further political alliance required in return, they continue to rule. Similarly, yet not as mightily, that is how the rest of political leaders in Lebanon have received their legal authority and that’s how they also abuse it and with the electoral system present it puts the country in a loop that’s hard to come out of, which leaves people with no choice but to abide by the leader of their sect’s party and support them in return of the benefits. Regardless whether some align their vision with Hezbollah or do not, Lebanese people do not consider them as a terrorist group. Considering all the socio political problems surrounding the history of their emergence, the dedication in protecting Lebanon’s land against Israeli forces and legacy in retrieving the occupied areas of the south, all in the absence of a dependable government puts Nasrallah in a position were they translate the vision of a great population. However, the legal legitimacy they’ve received after acquiring traditional and charismatic authority is being abused, through a political propaganda presenting themselves as an only alternative to the state’s failure and playing on religious and sectarian fundamentals and not aiming at changing the situation to help build an independent governmental system.
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